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OBJECTIVITY AND HABEAS CORPUS:
SHOULD FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES
BE PERMITTED TO RULE UPON THE VALIDITY
OF THEIR OWN CRIMINAL TRIAL CONDUCT?
Marilyn L. Kelley*

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was adopted in 1948 with the avowed
purpose of providing an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous federal sentences without resort to habeas corpus. 1 The major
innovation of section 2255 is its jurisdictional limitation that "[a]
prisoner ... may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. " 2 Prior to this enactment,
the proper forum for federal prisoners seeking collateral review of
their judgments of conviction was the district in which they were
incarcerated. 3 But the tremendous burden placed upon the few
federal judges sitting in those districts, 4 certain abuses of the writ
of habeas corpus by petitioners;5 and the cost and inconvenience of
requiring sentencing judges and assistant United States attorneys
to appear as witnesses at habeas hearings in distant forums 6 led to
the adoption of section 2255. Thereafter, only where the statutory
remedy proved "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of
the incarceration was a federal prisoner to be permitted to seek a
writ of habeas corpus. 7 Commentators soon expressed fears that
the new statute would impinge upon the right to the writ of habeas
corpus, 8 and in 1950 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
section 2255 void as a suspension of the writ in violation of Article
*Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University, College of Law. B.A., 1964,
Michigan State University; J.D., 1971, Wayne State University; LL.M., 1975, Columbia
University.
This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the J .S.D. degree,
Columbia University.
·
'See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), Reviser's Note.
2 28 U .s.c. § 2255 (1970).
3 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952); Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188
(1948).
4 See Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, IO OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1949).
5See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 171-74 (1948).
6 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 217 n.25.
7 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) reads in part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized
to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it·
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or ·that such court has denied him relief, unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.
8 See, e.g., Note, Section 2255 of the Judicial Code: The Threatened Demise of Habeas
Corpus, 59 YALE L,J. 1183 (1950).
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I, § 9 of the Constitution. 9 To avoid reaching this constitutional
issue, the Supreme Court held that the statute is a complete substitute for the constitutional right of habeas corpus, and that it maintains as broad a scope, procedurally and substantively, as that
guaranteed by habeas corpus. 10 In construing section 2255, the
Court declared that the statutory remedy does not impinge upon
the right of habeas corpus, since it affords "the same rights in
another and more convenient forum." 11
On April 26, 1976, the Supreme Court prescribed rules to govern
collateral proceedings in United States district courts brought by
federal prisoners pursuant to section 2255 . 12 Rule 4(a) provides
that the motion to vacate shall be heard by the judge who presided
at the movant's trial and sentenced him, or, if the judge who
imposed sentence was not the trial judge, then it shall be heard by
the judge who presided over that part of the proceedings being
attacked by the movant. 13 Thus, rule 4(a) restricts the jurisdictional
provision of section 2255 to refer to the specific judge who imposed
sentence or who presided over that part of the criminal proceedings
being collaterally attacked. The result is that the 2255 judge will
now issue an order to show cause why petitioner is being incarcerated when, in fact, it was that judge's own order, entered at.the
criminal trial, that incarcerated the petitioner.
Neither the legislative history nor the evils that section 2255 was
intended to cure require the procedure imposed by rule 4(a). It
should also be recognized that rule 4(a) goes further than the
statutory language or the former practice of the federal courts. The
statute only requires the petition to be filed in "the sentencing
court," and while several of the circuit courts of appeals had
interpreted "sentencing court" to mean "sentencing judge," 14 the
9 Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. g;anred; 341 U.S. 930
(1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2 reads, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it."
10 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952). Accord, Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 427 (1962). With this saving interpretation, hoped-for revisions in habeas procedures were sacrificed. For example, the modified res judicata provision was subsequently
considered to be declarative of the common law rule that res judicata may not apply to
denials of relief on habeas corpus or on a motion to vacate. See Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963).
"United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added).
12 Rules governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Order
of April 26, 1976, 96 S. Ct. at 7 (yellow pages) (1976).

13/d.

·

See Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022
(1967), relying on United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51-53 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 916 (1965); United States ex rel. Leguillou v: Davis, 212 F.2d 581,684 (3d Cir. 1954);
Clark v. Memolo, 174 F.2d 978,982 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348,
348-49 (4th Cir. 1949). Contra, Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 273-74 (1st Cir.
1967).
14
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sentencing judge may or may not have been the criminal trialjudge.
Furthermore, in the event that the sentencing judge had also been
the criminal trial judge, he was expected to recuse from the 2255
proceeding where, for example, he was to be a witness, 15 or where
his past knowledge might affect his independent judgment. 16 In
contrast, rule 4(a) specifically requires the petition to go to the
judge who presided over that part of the proceedings being attacked (whether he be the sentencingjudge or some other) with no
apparent discretion to recuse.
Since rule 4(a) provides a procedure significantly different from
common law habeas corpus and from previous 2255 practice, consideration should be given to whether the rule provides an
adequate basis for collateral review, or whether it impinges upon
the right of petitioners to have the independent and impartial review anticipated by the constitutional right of habeas corpus. 17
In addition, a substantial question may be raised concerning the
lack of administrative efficiency in following the procedure of rule
4(a). Though rule 4(a) provides no exceptions to the same judge's
presiding, statutory recusation requirements for bias or prejudice, 18 or for interest, 19 or for judges called as witnesses 20 ought
to be applicable to 2255 proceedings. Additional hearings would
necessarily be required to resolve these issues before reaching the
merits of the motion to vacate. Although these issues might be
raised no matter which judge presides, it seems far more likely that
they would be raised (perhaps even encouraged) where the criminal trial judge presides over the subsequent 2255 hearing. It is also
likely that the presiding judge would have personal knowledge of
the events challenged collaterally and thus would frequently be

15See United States v. Valentino. 283 F.2d 634, 636 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v.
Halley, 240 F.2d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 967 (1957).
16See United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973); Battaglia v. United
States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968).
17 Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,224
(1969); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963); Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181
(1906); Cross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 88 (1892); Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104, 113
(1889); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885). It is independent of the criminal proceeding. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 224; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 311-12;
Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923); Ex pa rte Tom Tong, I 08 U.S. 556, 559 (1883).
The question of illegal incarceration is to be considered independently of any question of
guilt, and entitlement to challenge illegal incarceration is not contingent upon proving one's
innocence. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. at 559. This notion merely expresses that a person
should not be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law and that guilt or
innocence has no bearing upon this determination. But see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037,
3050 (1976).
18 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(I) (Supp. V 1975).
19 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975). See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
20 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) and (b)(5)(iv) (Supp. V 1975).
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called as a witness. 21 Where the 2255 judge erroneously elects not
to disqualify himself from hearing the petition, the entire proceedings before that judge would be reversed and assigned to a different
judge to hear all over again. 22
These problems are unnecessary since the jurisdictional limitation of section 2255 does not require the same judge to preside, nor
has the statute ever been so interpreted. 23 It is the purpose of this
article to explore the consequences that rule 4(a) engenders by
requiring the criminal trial judge to preside over the collateral
attack and to rule upon the validity of his own work product.

I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2255
At common law, the habeas judge could not examine a conviction for any purpose other than to verify that the committing court
had jurisdiction to try the matter. 24 This limited use of habeas
corpus, adopted into the United States Constitution, was viewed as
a privilege that extended only to federal court prisoners. 25 In 1867,
however, Congress granted to prisoners detained by authority of
state courts the right to seek habeas corpus in federal district
courts. 26 More significantly, Congress provided an expansive subject matter jurisdiction clause permitting state court prisoners to

21 See Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965), where the original trial judge,
after refusing to entertain the motion and being reversed, see Juelich v. United States, 300
F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1962), and after refusing to produce petitioner at the subsequent required
hearing and being reversed, see Juelich v. United States, 316 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1963) (per
curiam), finally recused upon motion by the petitioner because the petitioner intended to call
the judge as a witness. 342 F.2d at 3 J. By then, more than a year had elapsed from the first
hearing required after reversal until the second subsequent hearing before a different judge.
Id. at 30, 31. See also, United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634,636 (2d Cir. 1960); United
States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 967 (1957).
22 See Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272-74 (1st Cir. 1967). See also, Battaglia v.
United States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968).
23 The procedure has simply been viewed as "highly desirable." Carvell v. United States,
173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949).
24 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830), where Chief Justice Marshall
wrote:
The judgment of a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on all
the world as the judgment of this court would be .... [A]n imprisonment under a
judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is
not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be
erroneous.
See generally, Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAN. B.
REV. 92 (1938); Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa -The Emergence of the Modern Writ
-/, 18 CAN. B. REV. 10 (1940); Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 LAW Q. REv. 64
(1902).
••see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 499 (1953); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,221 (1950)
(dissenting opinion).
26 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 385 (now 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970)).
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raise not only jurisdictio~al claims but also -federal constitutional
and statutory claims. 27 Subsequently, this statutory provision was
construed to apply to federal criminal adjudications as well, 28
thereby expanding the issues subject to collateral attack by federal
prisoners. In addition, habeas corpus was made available to challenge matters dehors the record. 29 This extension of habeas review
to include deprivation of constitutional rights, even those not of
record, was made without adequate procedural controls. The inevitable result was a dramatic increase in habeas litigation, 30 much
of it without merit. 31 For example, habeas proceedings could be
invoked merely by petitioner's oath that the judgment was in
violation of his constitutional rights. 32 Since matters not contained
in the record could be asserted, much time and expense were
involved in bringing witnesses from a distant forum to testify with
respect to those matters. Even where records and files were available, they were located, more often than not, in a district other
than the one in which the petition was filed; therefore, much time

27/d. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 reads in part that the privilege of the Writ shall
extend to "all cases where any person may be re·strained of his or her liberty in violation of
the constitution .... "
28 See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,221 (1969). Prior to the Kaufman decision,
the development of the right of federal prisoners to challenge deprivation of constitutional
rights had been hindered by contorted attempts to fit constitutional violations into the
stringent test of "void for lack of jurisdiction." In 1879, the Supreme Court had expanded
the definition of l,ack of jurisdiction to include unconstitutional acts of Congress. A conviction resting upon an unconstitutional statute was considered null and void since the trial
court really acquired no jurisdiction of the cause. See Ex parte Siebold, JOO U.S. 371, 376
(1879). In 1938, the Supreme Court again found a jurisdictional bar to a conviction based
upon failure to appoint counsel where there was no showing that there had been intelligent
waiverof that right. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In 1942, the Supreme Court
held that an allegation of a coerced guilty plea could be challenged on habeas corpus. The
Court stated that
the use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a
conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to
those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of
preserving his rights.
Waley v.Johnston,316 U.S. IOI, 104-05 (1942). After Waley, federal district courts applied
this standard on a case-by-case basis, rejecting certain constitutional claims as not cognizable on habeas corpus. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 2171 220, 220 n.3. In
Kaufman, the Court held that deprivation of all constitutional rights, even those rendered by
courts of competent jurisdiction, may be challeilgecton habeas corpus. Id. at 221, 223, 231.
The Court relied directly upon the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 for this interpretation. Id. at
221.
29 See House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945) (state prisoner); United States ex rel.
McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220, 22 I (1943) (federal prisoner); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
IOI, 104 (1942) (federal prisoner); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938) (federal
.prisoner); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, I 12 (1935) (per curiam) (state prisoner)
(dictum); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (state prisoner).
30See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212, 212 n.13 (1952). See also Speck, supra
note 4.
31 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212, 212 n.14.
32 See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 283 (1941).
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and expense were involved in ordering and producing them.
Habeas corpus procedure was also complicated by the common
law rule that resjudicata is not applicable to issues raised in habeas
corpus proceedings, 33 permitting habeas litigation to be renewed
any number of times, and thereby increasing the burden of transferring records and requiring witnesses to appear in distant forums.
Finally, the ever-expanding notion of due process has provided
innumerable issues potentially cognizable in habeas proceedings,
likewise increasing the burden of habeas litigation, and the transfer
of records and appearance of witnesses.
In response to these problems, the Judicial Conference of the
United States appointed a committee, chaired by Chief Judge
Parker of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to examine
and recommend changes in the habeas procedures. 34 In 1944, the
Conference submitted two bills to Congress to revise habeas corpus procedures for both state and federal petitioners. 35 With respect to federal petitioners, the most significant proposal concerned a change in the appropriate forum for hearing collateral
petitions. 36 In a statement prepared by Circuit Judge Stone and
submitted to Congress by the Conference, 37 the proposed jurisdictional bill was described as follows:
This section applies only to Federal sentences. It creates a
statutory remedy consisting of a motion before the court where
the movant has been convicted. The remedy is in the nature 9f,
but much broader than, coram nobis. The motion remedy
broadly covers all situations where the sentence is "open to
collateral attack." As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as
habeas corpus. 38

Judge Stone's statement also explained the problems that the
jurisdictional bill was intended to remedy:
Most habeas corpus cases raise fact issues involving the trial
occurrences or the alleged actions of judges, United States
attorneys, marshals or other court officials. Obviously, it involves interruption of judicial duties 1f the trial Judge, the United States attorney, the court clerk or the marshal . . . [is]
required to attend the habeas corpus hearing as [a witness].
Such attendance is sometimes necessary to refute particular
33See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 7-15 (1963); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. i24,
230 (1924); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 240-41 (1924). For a critique of this
rule, se~ Kelley, Finality and Habeas Corpus: ls the Rule that Resludicata May Not Apply
to Habeas Corpus or Motion to Vacate Still Viable?, 78 W. VA. L. REV. I (1975).
34See 1942 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 18.
35 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1952).
36 See 1943 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 22-24.
37 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1952).
38/d. at 216-17.
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testimony which the prisoner may give and, obviously, such
attendance is the safest course. This is so because experience
has demonstrated that often petitioner will testify to anything he
may think useful, however false; and, without the witnesses
present to refute such, he is encouraged to do so and may make
out a case for discharge from merited puishment. 39

While the proposed bills of the Judicial Conference were pending, the Committee on Revision of the Laws of the House of
Representatives drafted a bill revising the entire Judicial Code. 40
Portions were drafted in conformity with the bills of the Judicial
Conference, in particular, the jurisdictional bill affecting federal
habeas corpus petitioners. 41
Subsequent to the revision of the Judicial Code, Judge Parker
wrote an article 42 listing the major abuses of the writ and giving his
impression of what the new legislation was intended to accomplish.
He asserted that the former procedure provided no opportunity for
the trial judge to supplement the record or to furnish a statement of
what had occurred at trial; that if heard, the trial judge was required to be heard in the capacity of an ordinary witness; and that
this practice resulted in the "unseemly spectacle of federal district
courts trying the regularity of proceedings had in courts of coordinate jurisdiction .... " 43 Judge Parker believed that the new statute would resolve these problems, and noted that "in the case of
federal prisoners, provision is made for relief by motion before the
sentencing judge and right to habeas corpus in such cases is greatly
limited .... " 44
Nothing in the legislative history, however, suggests that the
petition should be filed before the very judge who tried and sentenced the petitioner. In fact, the precise argument presented to
Congress for the necessity of enacting the jurisdictional bill was to
permit trial judges to appear as witnesses in their own districts for
the sake of convenience. 45
Shortly after the adoption of section 2255, in Carvell v. United
States, 46 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
the propriety of the criminal trial judge's presiding at the hearing of
a motion brought pursuant to section 2255 to vacate his own prior

/d. at 217 n.25.
/d. at 218.

39
40

41/d.
42

See Parker, supra note 5.

/d. at 172-73.
/d. at 174 (emphasis added). The notion that the criminal trial j~dge is th~ ap!'ropriate
judge to preside at the collateral hearing attacking the validity of his own pnor Judgment
appears to have been conceived in this article. _
45See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 217 n.25 (1952).
46 17_3 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949).
43
44
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sentence. In a per curiam opinion, in which Chief Judge Parker
participated, the court ruled that:
Not only was there no impropriety in this, but it is highly
desirable in such cases that the motions be passed on by the
judge who is familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the trial, and is consequently not likely to be misled by
false allegations as to what occurred. It was to avoid the unseemly practice of having attacks upon the regularity of trials
made before another judge through resort to habeas corpus that
section 2255 of Title 28 was inserted in the Judicial Code.47

Since Judge Parker was chairman of the committee appointed by
the Judicial Conference to study the problems of habeas litigation
and to make recommendations for correcting those problems,
much deference has been accorded to this opinion in the belief that
it represents Judge Parker's understanding of section 2255 and that
it is good evidence of the legislative intent. 48 Only the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has taken issue with this statement of
statutory purpose. 49
It has already been suggested that one of the main purposes of
section 2255 was to provide a convenient forum in which the trial
judge might testify, if necessary. That purpose is, obviously, contrary to the interpretation rendered in Carvell.
Beyond this inconsistency, Carvell suggests two significant issues: first, that it is highly desirable that the motions be passed
upon by the judge who is familiar with the facts; and second, that
the criminal trial judge is not likely to be misled by allegations in
the 2255 petition as to what had occurred. The first issue raises the
question of the proper function of the 2255 judge. Since Carvell
was decided before the landmark decision of Townsend v. Sain 50
(which set forth explicit criteria mandating factfinding by the
habeas judge), it is appropriate to reconsider the validity of the
rationale that there is no impropriety in permitting the judge who
tried the criminal case to preside over a 2255 evidentiary hearing
attacking the validity of that trial. The second issue raises by
implication the question of the propriety of the ·trial judge's acting as
both witness and trier of fact in the same proceeding. These issues

/d. at 348-49.
See Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1022
(1967), relying on United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51-53 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,381
U.S. 916 (1965); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681,684 (3d Cir. 1954);
Clark v. Memolo, 174 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
••see Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1967), where the court said
""[W]e find nothing ... to indicate that ·court' was used in the restrictive sense of a specific
judge."
so372 U.S. 293 (1963).
47

48

52

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:44

should be considered in light of the functions and discretionary
powers of the 2255 judge.
II.

THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE

A.

2255

JUDGE

Fact.finding: The Townsend Guidelines

The statute of 186751 enlarged the habeas court's functions to
include the power to order evidentiary hearings and to "try the
facts anew. " 52 In Townsend v. Sain, 53 the Supreme Court asserted
that evidentiary hearings are mandatory where:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the

state hearing;
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record as a whole;
(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state-court hearing; or
(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not
afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. 54

All of these guidelines (except the third) have been held applicable
to section 2255 proceedings. 55 Reading these guidelines in light of
the procedure required by rule 4(a), it is doubtful that a 2255 review
· will be more than pro forma. Can the same judge determine objectively his own fairness and completeness in the criminal proceedings, particularly where the 2255 judge's ruling will be based upon
his own subsequent factfinding and where the adequacy of that
factfinding will thereafter be subject only to limited appellate review? ·
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466
(1938). The Act of 1867 reads in part: "[T]he said court or judge shall proceed in a summary
way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing testimony and the arguments of the parties
interested .... "
53 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
541d. at 313. Even the dissent agreed that the district court had the power to receive
evidence and try the facts anew. Id. at 326 (Stewart dissenting, with whom Justices Clark,
Harlan and White joined). Moreover, the dissent agreed that "[w]here the facts are Ml
dispute, the federal court ... must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did
not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court .... " Id. at 327.
""See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 (1969), where the Court said that
"only the duty of the federal habeas court to scrutinize 'the fact-finding procedure' under (3)
does not apply in the case of a federal prisoner; federal factfinding procedures are by
hypothesis adequate to assure the integrity of the underlying constitutional rights."
51

52
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It seems unlikely that such a review will be adequate to insure
the underlying integrity of the prior criminal proceeding. This
problem is well demonstrated in McDonald v. United States, 56
where the trial judge who originally took petitioner's guilty plea
dismissed a subsequent motion to vacate without a hearing, even
though petitioner had alleged his own mental incompetence at the
time he entered the guilty plea. 57 The dismissal was reversed on
appeal, and the case remanded with a direction to the trial judge to
hold an evidentiary hearing. 58 The 2255 judge then held the obligatory hearing, made a finding that petitioner was competent at
the time his plea was entered, and again dismissed the motion. 59
On appeal, the judgment was affirmed for the reason that "the trial
court's findings are well supported by the evidence and they are
conclusively binding here. " 60 The net result of this procedure is
that it permits the trial judge to find as true those facts which
support his own prior ruling.
B.

Discretionary Powers

A conviction carries with it the presumption of regularity, 61 and
the burden of proving its irregularity rests upon the petitioner. 62
While a motion to vacate under section 2255 is a civil proceeding, 63
requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 64 the burden
of proving irregularity apparently may increase simply by the passage of time from the entry of sentence to the filing of a motion. 65
Even where evidence is undisputed, the court may choose to
disbelieve the petitioner's evidence, 66 and that disbelief may be

56 341 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1965), dlsmissal affd on remand, 356 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1966)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 936 (1966).
57/d. at 378.
said.
59 See McDonald v. United States, 356 F.2d 980, 981 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 936 (1966).
60 /d. at 982.
61 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 280, 286
(1889); Hilliard v. United States, 345 F.2d 252, 255 (10th Cir. 1965) (presumption of validity);
Simpson v. United States, 342 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1965) (presumption that the court
acted reasonably).
62 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938).
63 See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,224 (1969), quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
64 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469.
65 See United States v. Forlano, 212 F. Supp. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 319 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Wiggins, 184 F..Supp. 673, 676
(D.D.C 1960); United States v. Edwards, 152 F. Supp. 179, 183 (D.D.C 1975), ajf'd,
256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
66 See Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271,_ 279 (1945).
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based upon the mere passage of time, 67 leading the court to find
that the petition "lacks merit" 68 or that it lacks "good faith and
credibility.' ' 69
The 2255 judge is empowered to make value judgments concerning petitioner's motion, 70 and relying upon those judgments, to
grant or deny varied forms of assistance to petitioner in challenging
the conviction. 71 The judge may, for example, find the petition
factually insufficient on its face 72 and summarily dismiss it, 73 without requiring the Government to respond. 74 The court may permit

67See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 531 (4th Cir. 1970) (The delay in filing merits
consideration.); Morse v. United States, 304 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (A
claim filed at such a late date was "suspect."); Malone v. United States, 299 F.2d 254, 256
(6th Cir. 1962) (The failure to assert a claim earlier "raises a strong inference of invalidity.);
Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (The burden of proof was
magnified by the lapse of time.); United States v. Lowe, 173 F.2d 346,347 (2d Cir. 1949)
(The allegations were considered a "mere afterthought."); Daughtry v. United States, 242
F. Supp. 771, 774 (E.D.N.C. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966), rehearing denied, 385
U.S. 965 (1966) (The allegations might have credence, but were adduced only after trial and
sentence; therefore,- they were considered "self-serving."). Contra, Sturrup v. United
States, 218 F. Supp. 279,281 (E.D.N.C. 1963); Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 869
(N.D. Ill. 1952), where the court stated, "No aging process, whereby a void judgment
improves as to stature and validity by the passage of time, can properly be interposed."
68 LaClair v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 819, 824 (N :D. Ind. 1965) .
. 69 Ailcen v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 43, 50 (M.D.N.C. 1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 604
(4th Cir. 1961).
.
10 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1963), where the Court said that "the
sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting
a full evidentiary hearing." See also Johnson v. United States, 239 F.2d 698,699 (6th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956), where the court asserted, in affirming the denial of
an evidentiary hearing, "[W]e calJJ)ot believe that the Supreme Court intended in its care for
the protection of human liberty to impose upon the inferior courts the duty of recalling,
years after action in criminal cases, prisoners for rehearings based on obviously nebulous and
false accusations."
71 See Malone v. United States, 299 F.2d 254, 255-56 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
863 (1962) where the court said:
It is not the law that in every case where the movant may set forth a claim which
appears to be good on paper although manifestly false in fact and frivolous, the
District Court is nevertheless obliged to grant him an oral hearing ....
It is necessary that the movant substantiate his conclusions by allegations of fact
with some probability of verity.
See also United States v. Mathison, 256 F.2d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 1958) (petition requires more
than "wild and unsupported charges"); Nemirka v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 463, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (not entitled to a hearing if the assertion is "incredible").
72 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 19 (1963); Aeby v. United States, 409 F.2d I, 2
(5th Cir. 1969) (allegation of prejudicial remarks was a "mere conclusion"); Benthiem v.
UnitedStates,403 F.2d 1009, 1011, 1011 n.5(lstCir.1968),cert.denied, 396U.S.945(1969)
(specificity of fact required to justify furnishing petitioner a transcript); United States v.
Lowe, 367 F.2d 44, 45-46 (7th Cir. 1966) (allegation that petitioner pleaded guilty because of
"threats and promises" held too vague to require inquiry); Hammond v. United States, 309
F.2d 935, 936 (4th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (petitioner's allegation of knowing use of perjured
testimony legally insufficient, so summary dismissal not error).
73 See Wilkins v. United States, 258 F.2d 416,417 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cited with approval by
the Supreme Court in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 19 (1963), though the Court
noted that "the better course might have been to direct petitioner to amend his motion ...."
See also Stephens v. United States, 246 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
74 See Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 529 (4th Cir. 1970); Conway v. California
Adult Auth., 396 U.S. 107, 109-10 (1969) (per curiam). See also Rule 3(b) governing 2255
Proceedings, 96 S. Ct. 27 (yellow pages) (1976).
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petitioner to amend his petition to set forth facts more specifically
in order to avoid dismissal, 75 but it is not error to deny the opportunity to amend and to dismiss summarily. 76 The court may dismiss
a petition, moreover, upon the value judgment that petitioner
probably has no set of facts other than un~upported conclusions to
demonstrate his entitlement to a hearing. 77
It is well-recognized that lay people, not adept at pleading and
unaware of the significance of pleading particular facts, may plead
conclusory allegations that are insufficient on their face. Because
of this, district courts have been admonished to construe pleadings
liberally. 78 Yet, permitting amendment of conclusory allegations is
discretionary and, since the statute permits successive similar applications, 79 courts frequently dismiss rather than permit amendment, noting that the dismissal is without prejudice to the bringing
of a subsequent petition. 80 This is unfortunate not only because it
wastes time and encourages repetitious applications, but also because it subjects the petitioner to the discretionary power of the
court to dismiss a second or successive petition seeking similar
relief. 81 This should not be; dismissal for insufficient pleadings is
not a dismissal on the merits. 82 Nonetheless, courts become impatient,83 and petitioners get caught in the maze of rules and discretionary powers of the courts. Thus conclusory pleadings result
in dismissal; subsequent and belated pleadings of fact pecome
"suspect, " 84 magnifying petitioner's burden of proof. 85 The
petitioner may then be required to demonstrate that his belated
pleadings are not "an abuse of the writ or motion remedy. " 86
See Stephens v. United States, 246 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
1s1d.
77 United States v. Mathison, 256 F.2d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 1958).
78 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 22 (1963), where the Court stated that "[a]n
applicant ... ought not to be held to the niceties of lawyers' pleadings . . . . "
79 28 U .S.C. § 2255 (1970), which reads in part "[a] motion for such relief may be made at
any time." This has been interpreted to mean that "as in habeas corpus, there is no statute
of limitations, no res judicata, and that the doctrine of !aches is inapplicable." Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1959) (concurring opinion).
""See, e.g., Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526,531,531 n.5 (4th Cir. 1970); Aeby v.
United States, 409 F.2d I, 2 (5th Cir. 1969); Oliver v. United States, 398 F.2d 353, 355-56,
356 n.5 (9th Cir. I 968).
81 28 U .S.C. § 2255 (1970), reads in part: "The sentencing court shall not be required to
entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner."
82 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 19 (1963).
83See Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), where the
court said in discu'ssing petitioner's motion that it "def[ied] intelligent analysis"; Heisler v.
United States, 321 F.2d 641, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1963), where the court said in dismissing
petitioner's motion and denying him an opportunity to amend, -"If this be appellant's
meaning. however. in our judgment it is not demanding too much of him to ask that he take
the responsibility of coming right out and saying so in a recital of facts . . . . "
"'Morse v. United States, 304 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. l962) (per-curiam).
85 See Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
86 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 17 (1963). It should be noted that in Sanders the
Court placed the burden of pleading abuse of the writ on the Government. Id. at 17. Under
rule 9(a) governing § 2255 proceedings, however, the burden appears to be shifted to the
75
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Ultimately, the court may simply make the value judgment that
petitioner must surely have known of the significance of the facts
belatedly pleaded and therefore dismiss his petition 87 (for intentionally splitting his cause of action 88 or for vexing, harassing, and
delaying 89 the court's administration) without ever deciding the
merits.
The 2255 court has discretion to appoint counsel, 90 and may do
so upon a conclusion that the petition is not frivolous. 91 Yet it is
very likely that a petition will appear frivolous due to petitioner's
inability. to plead his own cause effectively, which only demonstrates the need for professional assistance in preparing his petition. 92
The court also has discretion to grant or deny a transcript to a
petitioner. 93 While many claims may not be based upon occurrences that would appear in a transcript, denial of a transcript
requires petitioner to plead matters to the best of his recollection,
and thus he may fail to raise all claims known to him. Again, an
initial failure to raise all claims subjects petitioner to the discretion-

petitioner. In fact, a delay of more than five years in filing a motion creates a presumption
that there is prejudice to the Government. Rule 9(a) permits the court to dismiss a delayed
petition upon a finding of prejudice to the Government, and rule 9(b) permits the court to
dismiss a successive motion where the court finds that failure to assert the subsequent claim
in a prior motion is not excusable.
87 See Hilbrich v. United States, 406 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1969).
""See Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924).
89 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963).
• 0 see Ford v. United States, 363 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Thomas v. United
States, 308 F.2d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 1962). Formerly, even where an evidentiary hearing was
required under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), or Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. I (1963), it was still within the trial court's discretion to refuse appointment of counsel.
See Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1970) (dictum). But see Campbell v. United
States, 318 F.2d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1963). Rule 8(c) governing 2255 proceedings now requires
appointment of counsel where an evidentiary hearing is required; and rule 6(a) requires
appointment of counsel where discovery is necessary; otherwise, the rules leave untouched
the trial court's discretionary power to appoint counsel.
••see Farrar v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 264, 268 (W.D. Wis. 1964) (no counsel where
petition is "completely groundless or utterly and hopelessly frivolous" quoting Cerniglia v.
United States, 230 F. Supp. 932, 936 (N.D. Ill. 1964)), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Farrar, 346 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1965); Jackson v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D.
Tex. 1964) (no counsel where petition has "no possible merit"), aff'd, 339 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.
1964) (per curiam).
92 See Taylor v. United States, 221 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1955) (per curiam), where
petitioner's motion was dismissed for failure to plead the word "knowing" in his allegation
of perjured testimony.
93 See United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976); Benthiem v. United States, 403
F.2d 1009, 1011, 1011 n.4 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 945 (1969) (awarding of a
transcript is not automatic); Rakes v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 812, 816 (W.D. Va. 1964),
aff'd, 352 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), where the court said in denying petitioner's
request for a transcript:
The petitioner is not entitled to a transcript at government expense in order that he
might search the record for error .... Rakes ... states as his reason for requesting the transcript ... that he wishe[s] to amend his petition after he receives a copy
of the transcript. Clearly, the petitioner lacks faith in the allegations he has made in
his petition and hopes to find something in the transcript to bolster his petition.
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ary power of the court to dismiss his subsequent petition for
splitting his claims. 94
The court has the further discretion to grant or deny leave to
appeal in forma pau·peris from a ruling adverse to petitioner. 95
Denial of leave to appeal in forma pauperis is based upon the trial
judge's certification that the petition is without merit and not taken
in good faith. 96 This denial may thus foreclose review on the simple
ground that there was no abuse of discretion in denying an appeal
in forma pauperis. 97
The court also has discretion to determine whether a claim is
"substantial" before granting a full evidentiary hearing. 98 Thus
even when not required under the Townsend guidelines, the court
may choose to grant an evidentiary hearing whenever it believes
the claims are substantial or meritorious. 99 Where the court determines that a hearing will be granted, it has the further discretion to
determine whether petitioner's presence will be ordered; 100
whether counsel will be appointed; 101 whether certain witnesses
will be subpoenaed; 102 whether continuances will be granted 103 or

See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 9-10, 22 (1963).•
See Turner v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Mo. 1962), appeal dismissed, 325
F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1964).
· 96 /d. at 261. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l970).
91 See Turner v. United States, 206 F. Supp. at 261.
98 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. I, 21 (1963). Compare Turner v. United States,
271 F.2d 855, 856 (8th Cir. 1959) (per curiam), where petitioner's claimed denial of effective
assistance of counsel was dismissed as a "self-serving unsupported arid belated declaration
.... " with United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952), where the Court said that
"where ... ·there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which the prisoner participated, the trial court should require his production for a hearing.", and Walker v. Johnston,
312 U.S. 275, 287 (1941), where the Court said "[t]he Government's contention that his
allegations are improbable and unbelievable cannot serve to deny him an opportunity to
support them by evidence.", and Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,495 (1962),
where the Court said, "We cannot agree with the Government that a hearing ... would be
futile because of the apparent lack of any eyewitnesses to the occurrences alleged, other
than the petitioner himself and the Assistant Uriited States Attorney." (emphasis added).
99See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963). See also Johnson v. United States, 239
F.2d 698, 699 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam), cert denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956), where the court
in affirming the denial of petitioner's motion said, "His allegations seem to follow a pattern
which has become prevalent to enable convicts under long-time sentences to obtain vacations from imprisonment by trumped-up charges against their attorneys and court officials,
even including district judges."
.
.
• 00 See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,495 (1962); United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205, 222-23 (1952). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
• 01 See Day v. United States, 428 F.2d I 193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1970) (appointment of counsel
discretionary, and not constitutionally required); Ford v. United States, 363 F.2d 437 (5th
Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Thomas v. United States, 308 F.2d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 1962). There is
no longer any discretion where an evidentiary hearing is required, see rule S(c) governing
2255 proceedings, or where discovery is necessary, see rule 6(a) governing 2255 proceedings,
102 See Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895) (criminal trial); Bistram v. United
States, 248 F.2d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1957) (2255 proceeding).
103See Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 72 (1895) (criminal trial); Johnston v.
United States, 292 F.2d 51, 53 (10th Cir. 1961) (2255 proceeding).
94
95
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discovery permitted; 104 whether evidence will be taken by oral
testimony, affidavits, 105 or depositions; 106 and further, which rules
of procedure (civil or criminal) will govern the proceedings. 107
Finally, trial courts are placed in the position not only of protecting the criminal judgments (which have a presumption of validity
and are not lightly set aside) 108 but also of protecting counsel who
are under attack for incompetency . 109 This protective position of
the court certainly makes the preponderance-of-the-evidence test a
heavier requirement than in other civil proceedings. When it is the
same judge presiding, who may wish to protect a conviction which
he believes to have been fairly proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
and who, having heard the evidence, is convinced of petitioner's
guilt, he may find it difficult to view petitioner's claims objectively
and independently of the prior criminal proceeding.U 0 He may, in
his desire to protect the judgment, exercise his discretionary and
evaluative powers to diminish petitioner's ability to mount a successful attack, or to enhance the judgment's chances of surviving
the attack.
This exercise of discretionary powers may not constitute overt
bias or prejudice sufficient to require statutory recusation, 111 but it
may destroy the independence and.objectivity contemplated by the
right to the writ of habeas corpus. 112 The basic concern must be

104 Rule 6(c) governing 2255 proceedings provides in part that "[a) party may invoke ...
discovery ... if, and to the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for
good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not otherwise."
105See Phillips v. United States, 533 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. United
States, 239 F.2d 698, ff)9 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956).
106See Kimbrough v. United States, 226 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1955).
107 Rule 12 governing 2255 proceedings p~ovides that:
If no procedure is specifically prescribed by these rules, the district court may
proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules, or any applicable
statute, and may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, whichever it deems most appropriate, to motions filed
under these rules.
108 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); Scherk v. United States, 242 F. Supp.
445,447 (N.D. Cal. 1965), afj'd sub nom. Scherck v. United States, 354 F.2d 239 (9th Cir.
1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 882 (1965); United States v. Calp, 83 F. Supp. 152,
156 (D. Md. 1949).
109 See Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1%6), where the court said: "It is not
counsel who is on trial."; Scherk v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 445, 450 (N .D. Cal. 1965),
afj'd sub nom. Scherck v. United States, 354 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 882 (1965); United States v. Edwards, 152 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D.D.C. 1957),
aff'd, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where the district court said, "[T)he courts are equally
bound to protect members of the bar appearing before them against unjust and unwarranted
attacks." See also id. at 186.
110See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 239 F.2d 698,699 (Gth Cir. 1956) (percuriam), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1956), where the court in affirming the denial of petitioner's motion
referred to the district judge's written order, which asserted "his conviction that [petitioner)
had been fairly tried, was ably represented by highly experienced counsel, and that the judge
was convinced of [petitioner's) guilt .... "
'"See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
' 12See _notes 288-96 and accompanying text infra.
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whether permitting a 2255 judge to exercise these discretionary
powers in order to control the extent of review of his own prior
criminal trial conduct provides an adequate collateral ·review.
C.

Limited Appellate Review

Where the motion to vacate is ineffective to test the validity of
the judgment, one may theoretically seek a writ of habeas corpus
before a differentjudge.11 3 This right is merely theoretical. 114 Since
the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Hayman 115 that
section 2255 is a complete substitute for habeas corpus, 116 section
2255 has been treated as the exclusive remedy for petitioners
seeking to attack their convictions collaterally. 11 7 Thus, the sole
remedy for denial of relief under section 2255 is by appeal, 118 not
by petition for writ of habeas corpus. 119
Refusal of the 2255 judge to exercise his discretionary powers is
reversible on appeal only for abuse of discretion, 120 and his findings of fact and evaluations of the merits and credibility of
petitioner's claims are reversible only when clearly erroneous. 121

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), set out at note 7 supra.
See, e.g., Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 911
(1956), where the court reversed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus by the district court for
the reason that petitioner had previously been denied similar relief under § 2255 by the
sentencing court, and that there was no allegation in the habeas petition that the remedy by
motion to vacate was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the sentence. Id. at
577-78. This decision was rendered in spite of the fact that the court agreed with the lower
court's legal conclusion regarding the validity of petitioner's claim. The reversal appears to
have been grounded solely on the appellate court's conclusion that the district court was
without jurisdiction to hear the petition.
115 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
116/d. at 219.
117See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,427 (1962); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S.
415, 421 (1959) (concurring opinion); Brown v. United States, 351 F.2d 564, 568 (7th Cir.
1965); Williams v. United States, 283 F.2d 59, 60 (10th Cir. 1960).
118See Cagle v. Humphrey, 112 F. Supp. 846,847 (M.D. Pa. 1953), where the court said in
denying habeas corpus:
This remedy[§ 2255] is not an intermediate step but an exclusive substitute except
in those rare situations where the remedy by motion would be inadequate or
ineffectual. Since the remedy under§ 2255 is exclusive, if applic'ant is unsuccessful
on such motion, it does not entitle him to a reconsideration by habeas corpus in
another district. His remedy is by appeal from the judgment on the motion.
119 The mere denial of relief under § 2255 does not demonstrate the inadequacy or
ineffectiveness of the motion remedy, entitling one to seek a writ of habeas corpus. See
Walker v. United States, 429 F.2d 1301, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Sanchez v.
Taylor, 302 F.2d 725, 726 (10th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 864 (1962);
United States v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312,314 (3d Cir. 1953),cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902 (1954);
Jones v. Squier, 195 F.2d 179, 180 (9th Cir. 1952); Martin v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350,352 (5th Cir.
1949).
120See, e.g., Irwin v. United States, 414 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Parsons v.
United States, 404 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d
445, 448 (9th Cir. 1962); McBee v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1961); Beck v. Wings
Field, Inc., 122 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir. 1941:,.
121 See Lucero v. United States, 425 F.2d 172, 173 (10th Cir, 1970) (per curiam); Martin v.
'United States, 399 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
113

114
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Thus, the appellate checks upon the 2255 judge are extremely
limited, leaving the right of collateral review (pursuant to rule 4(a))
subject to the power of the very judge whose rulings are being
attacked.

Ill. PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO
THE PROMULGATION OF RULE 4(a)

A.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has never squarely considered the issue of
the propriety of the same judge's presiding at both the criminal trial
and the subsequent hearing attacking the validity of that trial. It
has, however, implicitly approved the practice by acknowledging
its use in three major cases, 122 two of which provide interesting, if
not lucid, dicta touching on the issue.
In Machibroda v. United States, 123 petitioner pleaded guilty to
two informations and was given consecutive sentences of twentyfive and fifteen years. 124 Three years later, petitioner filed a motion
to vacate sentence before the same judge who had sentenced him,
on the ground that the pleas had been induced by promises of the
assistant United States attorney that petitioner would receive a
maximum sentence of not more than twenty years. 125
The Government admitted that the assistant United States attorney had visited petitioner in jail before sentencing and had told him
the court might well take his refusal to talk into consideration, but·
denied that he had made any promises or threats. 126 Without an
evidentiary hearing, the judge determined that petitioner's allegations were false and denied the motion. 127 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 128

122See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 219(1%9); Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S I, 20 (1963); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962) & 4% (dissenting
opinion). In Kaufman, the trial judge dismissed the petition because he believed that the
issue of illegal search and seizure was not cognizable on a motion to vacate. Therefore, the
issue of the same judge's presiding was not relevant to the Supreme Court's decision on that
issue.
·
123 368 U.S. 487 (1%2).
124/d. at 488.
125/d. at 488, 489.
126 /d. at 491-92.
121 United States v. Machibroda, 184 F. Supp. 881, 883, 885-86 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affd,
280 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1960) (per curiam), rev'd, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
128 Machibroda v. United States, 280 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1%0) (per curiam), rev'd, 368 U.S.
487 (1%2).
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded for a hearing, 129 stating that the district court had not
proceeded in conformity with 28 U .S.C. § 2255 when it made
findings on controverted issues of fact without an evidentiary hearing.130 Since the petition alleged occurrences outside the courtroom, there was no record. Thus, "[t]his was not a case [which
could be] conclusively determined either by the motion ... or by
the 'files and records' in the trial court." 131
Despite the clear language of the statute that only those cases
which can conclusively be decided by the motions, files, and records require no hearing, 132 the Supreme Court intimated that there
might be yet other cases which the 2255 judge could resolve without a hearing by "drawing upon his own personal knowledge or
recollection." 133 The Court did not spell out, however, what circumstances would create such a case, concluding obliquely that:
What has been said is not to imply that a movant must always
be allowed to appear in a district court for a full hearing if the
record does not conclusively and expressly belie his claim, no
matter how vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible his allegations may be. The language of the statute does not strip the
district courts of all discretion to exercise their common
sense. 134

The dissent contended that the majority had rejected tht! inferences drawn from the files and records by the courts below and had
substituted its own finding that "these materials do not conclusively belie petitioner's story .... " 135 According to the dissent,
the opinion represents a failure to give due deference to the inferences drawn by the two lower courts, and unwarrantedly restricts
the summary disposition provision of section 2255. 136
Whether one agrees with the dissent or not, it seems safe to say
that the majority's proposed standard of "palpably incredible"
allegations is too vague to be helpful. Moreover, the entitlement of
the trial judge to rely upon his personal knowledge to defeat a 2255
petition is not necessarily limited by this standard. Even though the
allegations are precise and are not palpably incredible, the Court

Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 496 (1962).
/d. at 494.
13'/d.
132 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), which reads in part that "[u]nless the motion and the files
and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court
shall ... grant a prompt hearing thereon .... "
' 33 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. at 495.
129

130

134/d.

mid. at 497 (dissenting opinion).
136/d.
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seems to say that the trial judge may still use his personal knowledge to defeat a 2255 petition. 137 If the trial judge may so use his
personal knowledge, it is not clear under the language of Machibroda whether the trial judge may rely upon this knowledge in order
to dismiss a petition without holding any evidentiary hearing at all,
or whether the judge must hold a hearing, at which time he may
interject his personal knowledge to defeat petitioner's claims.
However the problem is viewed, neither procedure suggested
would be satisfactory. Were the judge permitted to avoid an
evidentiary hearing altogether, the procedure would contradict the
holding of Machibroda that the 2255 judge may not make findings
on controverted issues of fact without an evidentiary hearing. On
the other hand, were the judge permitted to be the State's material
witness, and then to rule on the truth and veracity of his own
testimony in order to defeat petitioner's claims, the court would be
embroiled in a conflict of interests, thereby giving rise to due
process issues. 138
The question of whether a trial judge may rely upon his personal
knowledge to defeat a petitioner's claim was addressed again in
Sanders v. United States. 139 There, petitioner, without assistance
of counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery . 140 At the sentencing, petitioner requested that the court send him to an institution
for treatment of drug addiction, stating, "I have been using narcotics off and on for quite a while." 141 Several months later,
petitioner filed a motion to vacate alleging that when he pleaded
guilty and was sentenced he was mentally incompetent because
narcotics were administered to him by the medical authorities at
the jai,l while he awaited his appearance in court. 142 The judge who
had received his guilty plea and sentenced him denied the motion
without a hearing, stating that "petitioner's complaints are without
merit in fact." 143 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

'"'Id. at 495, where the majority said: "Nor were the circumstances alleged of a kind that
the District Judge could completely resolve by drawing upon his own personal knowledge or
recollection."
138 See Part III C / & IV B infra.
139 373 U.S. I (1963).
140/d. at 4.
141/d.

/d. at 5.
Unreported opinion, quoted in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 6. The denial of a
hearing in the lower court was also based upon the trialjudge's opinion that§ 2255 gave him
discretionary power to refuse a hearing where petitioner could have raised the claim on a
prior motion, but had failed to do so. Id. at 6. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
a hearing, after having noted both grounds for denial of the hearing. The Court's opinion,
however, deals more extensively with the trial judge's discretionary power to deny hearings
on subsequent petitions than it does with the trial judge's p·ower to rely on his personal
knowledge to defeat petitioner's claim.
142
143
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affirmed; 144 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing.145
Significantly, the Supreme Court recognized that certain facts
outside the record might be known to the 2255 judge who had
received petitioner's guilty plea and sentenced him, but observed
that the facts alleged in this particular petition could not have been
known to the trial judge. 146 Therefore, the judge's impression that
the petitioner acted with intelligence and understanding in responding to the judge's inquiries "[could not] 'conclusively show,' as the
statute requires, that there [was] no merit in [petitioner's]
claim." 147 This statement suggests by negative implication that
were the facts of the petition within the personal knowledge of the
judge, his impressions would be treated as part of the "files and
records" for purposes of determining whether to grant or deny an
evidentiary hearing. Since those impressions are, in fact, unrecorded memories of the judge, their use under the guise of "files
and records" would not only defeat petitioner's right to an evidentiary hearing whenever the facts are in dispute, but also would
defeat the plain meaning of the statute that "[u]nless the motion
and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt
hearing .... " 148 . In addition to this potential use of the trial
judge's past observations as "records and files," it is also possible
that past observations may be used by the judge to determine that a
claim is "insubstantial" and therefore within the trial judge's discretionary power to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing. In Sanders, the Court recognized that the sentencing judge "has discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting a
full evidentiary hearing," 149 but declined to accept the trial judge's
finding that the complaints lacked merit. Instead, the Court reconsidered the files, records, and the facts alleged in the petition, and,
drawing its own inferences, concluded that no answer could be
deduced from the files and that the statute therefore required a
hearing. 150 The Court thereby precluded the trial judge's exercise
of discretion, and his use of common sense, past observations, and
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom as factors to be weighed in
the final decision to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing.

144S ee Sanders v. United States, 297 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1%1) (per curiam), rev'd, 373 U.S.
I (1963).
145 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 6.
146 Id. at 20.
'"Id.
148See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
149373 U.S. at 21.
150 Id. at 20.
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From Machibroda and Sanders one may infer that there are
limited circumstances when the trial judge presumably may use
common sense, past observations, and discretion to deny 2255
petitions. But neither of these opinions is helpful since neither
establishes a clear standard, or involves facts that would permit the
use of common sense or reasonable inference based upon past
observations. Moreover, no specific situation was suggested in
either opinion as being an appropriate one for summary disposition, without an evidentiary hearing, based upon the judge's personal knowledge. The extent to which a trial judge may use his past
observations in evaluating 2255 petitions is thus unresolved.
B.

The Courts of Appeals

Since the adoption of section 2255, it has never been error per se
for the same judge to rule upon the correctness or fairness of his
own judgment of conviction. 151 There have been, however, various
exceptions to this general rule, the broadest of which was created
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
In Halliday v. United States, 152 the trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea without inquiring into the voluntariness of his
plea or his understanding of the charges. 153 Twelve years later,
defendant filed a motion to vacate, requesting that he be permitted
to change his plea because he did not understand the significance of
the proceeeding. 154 The original sentencingjudge heard the motion
despite defendant's request that a different judge preside. 155 Following the hearing, the court ruled that the original proceeding was
sufficient, since there was nothing to indicate that defendant had
not acted voluntarily or had not understood the signficance of the
proceeding. 156
151 Arguably, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held this procedure to be error
per se. See Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972) (percuriam); Halliday
v. United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272-73 (1st Cir. 1967), petition denied, 274 F. Supp. 737 (D.
Mass. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 831 (1969) (per curiam);
Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader, 333 F.2d 798,808 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 931 (1964).
The general rule as stated in Haverhill was that where a second trial is required, a different
judge should preside. Since a motion to vacate is a different cause of action and not a
continuation of the criminal proceeding, it is a different trial falling within the rule of
Haverhill. See Halliday v. United States, 380 F.2d at 272. In Halliday, however, the court
distinguished factfinding from rulings of law. Id. at 272-74. Therefore, the rule of the First
Circuit may be that it is not error per se for the same judge to rule only upon a question of
law, which is subject to review by appeal; whereas, it would be error per se for him to take
evidence and make findings of fact.
152 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1967).
153/d. at 271.
154/d. at 271-72.
155/d. at 272.

1ss1d.
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 imposes a burden of inquiry
into the facts. 157 The necessity of a factual inquiry ..raised the
further issue of the propriety of allowing the same judge, who had
already made a finding of voluntariness on inadequate evidence, to
review the correctness of that determination. The court of appeals
held that this was not proper, since the 2255 court was "reweighing factual inferences and credibility, as distinguished from
applying rulings on issues of law." 158 In ruling, the court expressly
rejected Judge Parker's thesis that the purpose of section 2255 was
to permit the trial judge to review his own proceedings. 159
Moreover, the court rejected the contention that "it would be
unseemly for a judge to testify in contradiction to a defendant as to
a past occurrence in his courtroom," and asserted that "it [would
be] far worse that he should be the trier of fact to determine his
own credibility." 160 Nevertheless, the court found no constitutional compulsion for its ruling; rather, the decision was premised
upon a "conviction that the best practice dictates such a policy." 161
Beyond this broad exception requiring recusation where the
court is engaged in factfinding, the practice ofretuming to the same
judge was generally approved before the adoption of rule 4(a). 162 It
was not considered to be a violation of any notion of objectivity
under the due process clause, 163 and even where the trialjudge had
referred to the petition as "scurrilous," it was held not to be a
prejudgment that denied petitioner a fair hearing. 164 The practice

157/d ..

/d. at 272-73.
/d. at 273. The court stated "[W]e are not persuaded ... that the judge's connection
with the drafting of section 2255 should supplement legislative history that contains no such
suggestion, and which demonstrates concern with quite a different matter."
160/d. at 273.
161 /d. at 274. Even then, the court felt the practice would necessarily have to yield in
single-judge districts. This result is unnecessary. Congress has provided several means for
obtaining extra judicial help in any district court. See 28 U .S.C. §§ 291(c); 292(b); 292(c);
294(d); 296 (1970). See also note 166 infra.
162 See, e.g., Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, '389
U.S. l022 (1967); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681,684 (3d Cir. 1954);
Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1949); Guerra v. United States, 447
F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Osborn, 415 F.2d 1021, l025 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1015 (1970); Simpson v. United States, 342 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1965); Davis
v. United States, 210 F.2d 118, 122 (8th Cir. 1954) (by implication); Reiffv. United States,
299 F.2d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 937 (1963); Wrone v. United States,.
367 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Clark v. Memolo, 174 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir.
1949).
163See Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d 169, 170 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (by
implication); United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 5 I n.4 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 916 (1965).
164See Reiffv.·United States, 299 F.2d 366,367 (9th Cir. 1962) (percuriam), cert. denied,
372 U .s. 937 (1963).
158
159
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was also held not to violate the prohibition against suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus; 165 and, finally, it was held not to invoke
the exception under section 2255 that when the motion remedy is
"inadequate or ineffective" to test the validity of the judgment,
petitioner may seek a writ of habeas corpus in the district of
confinement. 166
A number of limited exceptions to the general rule are, however,
imposed by statute and case law, although there is no general
agreement among the circuits as to when any of them is to be
invoked. The statutory exceptions are: (1) that the same judge is
not permitted to preside where he would have to appear as a
witness; 167 (2) that the same judge is not permitted to preside
where specific bias or prejudice is asserted in an affidavit timely
filed, 168 and (3) that the same judge is not permitted to preside
where interest in the cause is alleged. 169 Although rule 4(a) says
that the same judge "shall" sit, and provides no exceptions other
than "unavailability" of that judge, 170 these statutory exceptions
should be read into the rule. Section 2255 is not expressly excepted
from any of these statutory recusation requirements; there is therefore no good reason why any of these statutory provisions governing judicial behavior should not be considered to govern 2255
proceedings.
The courts have required recusation under other limited circumstances, for example, where hearsay matters, such as presentence reports, might affect the judge's objectivity; 171 where the
judge is accused of having threatened to give petitioner a more
severe sentence were he to go to trial rather than plead guilty; 172 or
where the petition seeks reduction of a sentence . 1 73 These excep165 See Cantu v. Markley, 353 F.2d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 1965).
•••see Stirone v. Markley, 345 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829
(1965); Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 911 (1956);
United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681,684 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v.
Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902 (1954).
This argument rests upon the tenuous proposition that since there are single-judge districts, Congress must certainly have anticipated that the same judge would hear motions to
vacate sentences that he had already entered. See United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 53
(4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954).
This conclusion is unwarranted in light of the ample statutory provisions for reassignment of
judges to different districts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(c); 292(b); 292(c); 294(d); 296 (1970).
167 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975).
168See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). This statute may not, however, be invoked in § 2255
proceedings on the sole ground that the court rendered an adverse ruling in the prior criminal
proceeding. See Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1962).
169 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975).
110 Rule 4(a) governing 2255 proceedings, Order of April 26, 1976, 96 S. Ct. at 27 (yellow
pages) (1976).
171 See Battaglia v. United States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968).
' 72 See Matthews v. United States, 533 F.2d 900,901, 901 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976) (No rationale
was given for the recusation.).
173See United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 114_1, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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tions have been justified for policy reasons, such as the "appearance of justice," or for the "sake of the judge." 174
To the extent that rule 4(a) may be considered declarative of
prior practice, these exceptions can be read into the rule by con~
struing it to permit recusation where necessary under the rubric
that the judge is deemed "unavailable" to preside. The language of
the rule, however, does not lend itself easily to such an interpretation. Moreover, to construe the rule so liberally would destroy the
presumed advantages that Judge Parker envisioned by permitting
the same judge to preside.
C.

The Judge As Witness and Trier of Fact

1. Personal Observations: Error-The Supreme Court ruled in
Sanders v. United States 175 that the judge's impressions or personal observations of the defendant were not conclusive of the
issue of defendant's competency to stand trial. 176 This limitation
has been followed in the courts of appeals, 177 narrowly construed
to apply only to the issue of competency to stand trial. 178 But, as
suggested before, the Court in Sanders did not explain why the trial
judge's observations were not conclusive; and even if not conclusive, why they were not at least entitled to weight in determining
whether to deny an evidentiary hearing. In any event, it does not
seem likely that the decision in Sanders rested upon the premise
that the judge should not inject himself at all as a witness in the
determination of fact issues.
Certainly, where the judge is to provide information as a formal
witness, he is not permitted to act both as a witness and as a trier o·f
those facts which he introduces into the record. 179 The propriety of
such a practice would certainly be at issue. Yet even if the judge's
honesty or integrity were not at issue, the procedure would still be
highly improper. A judge's sense perceptions and memory are as
subject to failure as those of any other witness. It would be highly
questionable that ajudge as the trier of fact could properly give his
own recollections more credibility than those of other witnesses,
so that he could determine whose testimony is correct and whose

174S ee United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Mawson
v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972).
175 373 U.S. I (1%3).
116/d. at 20.
177See United States v. Collier, 399 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1968); Floyd v. United States,
365 F.2d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1966); Roe v. United States, 325 F.2d 556,558 (8th Cir. 1963) (per
curiam).
178See United States v. Collier, 399 F.2d at 707; Floyd v. United States, 365 F.2d at 378;
Roe v. United States, 325 F.2d at 558.
179 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); See also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. V 1975).
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incorrect, since this presumes that there is no weakness in his own
recollections.
Under Judge Parker's conception of 2255 proceedings, the sentencing judge would not be called as a formal witness, but would be
permitted to remain on the bench, casually interjecting his past
recollections into the proceedings, either by commenting or simply by privately corroborating the testimony of certain witnesses
and discounting the testimony of others. This procedure would be
comparable to one which permitted a judge to be called as a formal
witness, only to return to the bench to declare his testimony
credible and the testimony of those whom he refuted not credible.
Clearly, this latter procedure would be inappropriate under 28
U.S.C. § 455, if not a denial of due process of law. Yet, even this
procedure provides more protection than the informal witness procedure envisioned by Judge Parker. As a formal witness, the judge
is at least subject to cross-examination, and his past recollections
are made part of the record for appeal. Where he remains on the
bench as an informal witness, however, neither of these protections remains.
The difficulties with pei:mitting the judge to act as both witness
and trier of fact in the same proceeding are well demonstrated by
the case of Aeby v. United States. 180 In 1952, Aeby was convicted
after a jury trial and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. 181
Over the next seventeen years, he filed a number of motions to
vacate his sentence . 182 In his fourth motion, petitioner alleged that
both the trial judge and the United States attorney had made
prejudicial remarks before the jury during closing arguments. In
particular, the judge had allegedly remarked that petitioner had
previously appeared before the judge on similar narcotics charges,
that the judge had personally sentenced petitioner on those violations, and that the judge was personally aware of petitioner's use of
narcotics. The United States attorney had allegedly made prejudicial remarks in his closing argument concerning petitioner's prior
record, his failure to testify, and his association with a known
narcotics violator. 183 No record of closing arguments was then in
existence. 184
The 2255 judge denied the motion without a hearing and entered
an order that stated in part:

180 425 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
'"'Id. at 718.
182/d. See Aeby v. United States, 255 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1958); Aeby v. United States, 267
F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Aeby v. United States, 409 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam).
' 83 See Aeby v. United States, 425 F.2d at 718-19.
184 /d. at 718.
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The undersigned presided at both the trial and sentencing of this
Petitioner ....
The Court recalls all of the proceedings therein and hereby
finds and certifies that the arguments and statements alleged by
Petitioner to have been made by this Court and the prosecuting
attorney in the presence of the jury were not made and there
was no reference in the presence of the jury to any of the
matters so alleged by Petitioner. 185

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the basis that the district
judge's recollections, nearly seventeen years after the trial, were
not part of the record for the purpose of determining whether an
evidentiary hearing was required. 186 The court, citing Halliday v.
United States, 187 also ordered the hearing to be held before a
different judge. 188
The court in Aeby did not consider the question of denial of due
process or of the impropriety of the 2255 judge's interjection of his
personal recollections as an informal witness and ruling on his own
credibility in opposition to that of petitioner. The holding was
simply that seventeen years is too long a time to qualify the judge's
recollections as part of the "records and files." Reliance upon
Halliday was not explained. The Court in Halliday had simply held
that it was the better practice, where factfinding was involved, to
require a different judge to preside. 189 In an Aeby situation, however, it would seem to be necessary as a matter of due process to
remand to a differentjudge. Where the judge by formal order of the
court expresses his firm belief that his recollections of an unrecorded event occurring seventeen years before are flawlessly intact, and that none of the petitioner's claims are true, the court is
hop~lessly entwined in a dual role of being a witness to events and
a trier of fact to determine the truth of those events. Moreover,
since the trier of fact has already made up his mind with respect to
the ultimate facts to be found, any subsequent evidentiary hearing
would be meaningless.
What should be of concern here is that remand to a different
judge, under circumstances like the Aeby case, is no longer permissible under a strict reading of rule 4(a). 190 Upon· remand, such a
case would go to the very same judge who had already made up his
mind about the facts; any subsequent evidentiary hearing would be
1••1i ·at 719.
'""Id.
187 380 F.2d 270 (I st Cir. 1967).
188 Aeby v. United States, 425 F.2d at 719.
189 380 F.2d 270, 274 (I st Cir. 1967).
190See notes 12-13 and accompanying te.xt supra.

70

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:44

little more than proforma, and would appear to be a farce in terms
of due process.
2. Personal Observations and Prior Knowledge-There are
many cases in which the practice of returning to the same judge has
been challenged. 191 Various objections have been raised, 192 but the
'"'A. Request for different judge denied: Hoffa v. United States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.
1972); Odom v. United States, 455 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v.
Delsanter, 433 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); -Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d
1227 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971); Davis v. United States,
424 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970); Burris v.
United States, 430 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971); Lucero v.
United States, 425 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d
1151 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.921 (1970); Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618
(9th Cir. 1969); Dukes v. United States, 407 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 3% U.S.
897 (1969); King v. United States, 402 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1968); Mirra v. United States, 379
F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967); Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d
169 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 916 (1965); United States v. Hughes, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964); Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1962); Simmons
v. United States, 302 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1962); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.
1962) (by implication); Reiff v. United States, 299 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 937 (1963); United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1957) (per
curiam) (dictum), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 967 (1957); Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348
(4th Cir. 1949) (per curiam).
B. Request for different ji,dge granted: United States v. Ewing, 480 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.
1973) (per curiam) (The failure of the Government to keep its bargain that it would not
oppose defendant's request for probation required rehearing before a different judge to
determine "whether or not the sentencing judge was influenced by that failure," for the sake
of the "appearance of justice."); Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29 (I st Cir. 1972) (per
curiam) (The failure of the Government to keep its promise to recommend a more lenient
sentence required resentencing before a different judge for the "appearance of justice.");
Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969) (Where a rehearing was necessary to
determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea, a different judge was required.); Halliday v.
United States, 380 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1%7), petition denied, 274 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass.
1967), afj' d, 394 F.2d 149 (1968) (per curiam), afj'd, 394 U.S. 831 (1969)(per curiam) (It was
improper for the sentencing judge, once having made a finding of voluntariness on inadequate evidence, to preside over a 2255 proceeding to determine the voluntariness of a
guilty plea.); United States v. Valentino, 283 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (The judge
was disqualified where he was called as a material witness.). See also, Battaglia v. United
States, 390 F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968), where the court of appeals reversed and remanded
for a hearing, leaving the decision of whether to recuse to the district judge. The court said:
If, however, the judge discovers that he cannot avoid the consideration of material
contained in the presentence report, or any other hearsay information· not disclosed
to a party to the § 2255 hearing, the preservation of the proper image of justice
requires that he do one of two things. He should either excuse himself from
conducting the hearing, or he should reveal the particular information to the parties
Id. at 259.
192See Hoffa v. United States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1973) (prior adverse ruling);
Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1972) (motion under 28 U .S.C. § 455 for
interest where presiding judge was listed as "of counsel" at criminal trial); Morrison v.
United States, 432 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (motion under 28 U .S.C. § 144 for
bias where judge had observed a presentence report); Davis v. United States, 424 F.2d 1061
(5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (kn·owledge gained at trial before the judge without a jury);
Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1969) (prior adverse ruling); Dukes v.
United States, 407 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1969) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144 for bias arguing
that a hearing before the same judge was per se improper); Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d
1151 (2d Cir. 1969) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 for interest where the judge was a material
witness); King v. United States, 402 F.2d 58 (9th .Cir. 1%8) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144
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majority of the cases hold that there is no error in the practice. 193
These holdings generally rely upon the claimed statutory purpose
espoused by Judge Parker that it was the intent of section 2255 to
permit the trial judge to use his personal observations and recollections of the trial to refute false claims of petitioners brought in
collateral proceedings. 194
Prior adverse rulings alone are not considered sufficient to disqualify the judge from presiding over the 2255 hearing. 195 Where
the judge has gained knowledge about petitioner from hearsay
contained in presentence reports, this knowledge is not considered
prejudicial even though the source of that knowledge is not introduced into evidence and is not discoverable by the petitioner. 196
Personal observations of the judge that counsel did not appear
incompetent at the criminal trial have been used to refute petitioners' claims of incompetency of counsel. 197 In addition, judicial
notice has been taken of the general competency of counsel to
reject a claim of incompetency . 198 Finally, the court's inability to
have any personal recollections at all of biased statements al-

for bias where petitioner alleged that threatening words of the judge coerced him to plead
guilty); Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1967) (personal observations at trial);
Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (denial of fair hearing);
United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1964) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 arguing
that the judge had an interest in protecting the criminal judgment); United States v. Hughes,
325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1964) (motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 where the judge was a material
witness); Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. l962)(motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144
for bias on the basis of a prior adverse ruling); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d 71 (3d
Cir. 1962) (denial of due process); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) (by
implication: material witness); Reiff v. United States, 299 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam) (prejudgment before hearing); United States v. Halley, 240 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1957)
(per curiam) (material witness); Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949) (per
curiam)_ (impropriety of the procedure).
193 See cases cited in note 191 A. supra.
•••See Panico v. United States, 412 F.2d 1151, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1969); King v. United
States, 402 F.2d 58, 60 (9th Cir. 1968); Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir.
1967); Wrone v. United States, 367 F.2d 169, 170 (10th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); United States
v. Smith, 337 F.2d 49, 51-53 (4th Cir. 1964); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445,453 (9th
Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion); Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116, I 18 n.2 (7th Cir. 1962);
United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954).
195See Deitle v. United States, 302 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1962); Simmons v. United
States, 302 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. I 962), where the court stated that disqualification for
prejudice "was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of
adverse rulings .... " See also, Hoffa v. United· States, 471 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1973) (no
impropriety in the same judge's presiding over issues raised before in a prior motion to
vacate); Gallarelli v. United States, 260 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1958) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 938 (19.59) (not disqu.alified for prejudice despite judge's having a "judicial
predilection" obtained from hearing the criminal case).
196Compare Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam);
with Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 1962) (the court sustained·an
objection to inquiry concerning the presentence report), and Battaglia v. United States, 390
F.2d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1968).
191 Compare Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (I 958) (appellate court's observation); with United States v. Summerlin, 298 F .
.Supp. 929, 930 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
'""See United States v. Summerlin, 298 F. Supp. at 930.
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legedly made by him in the course of the trial has been used to
reject a claim that such statements were ever made. 199
In Burris v. United States, 200 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit imputed personal knowledge to the trial judge in
order to affirm the trial judge's denial of a 2255 hearing. In that
case, petitioner had alleged (1) that the trial judge had denied him a
fair trial by telling the jurors a story about children who were
addicted to narcotics, (2) that the trial judge had coerced the jurors
into returning a verdict by sending a verbal instruction through the
United States Marshal to "[t]ell the jury if they can't reach a
verdict in the next 30 minutes I will be compelled to lock them up
for the weekend," (3) that two agents and the United States Attorney had discussed the case in the corridor in the presence of
several members of the jury, and (4) that two agents had conducted
private conversations with members of the jury. 201
The 2255 judge, without requesting a response from the Government or holding an evidentiary hearing, summarily denied the
motion, 202 noting in his memorandum opinion that the first two
allegations were not reflected in the record, and that the last two
"allegation[s] ... [were] untrue .... " 203 The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that the 2255 judge was entitled to discount the
first two claims based upon the records and his own personal
knowledge, 204 and that the dismissal of the last two claims could be
justified on the presumption that the trial judge found them "incredible" since "[j]urors are closely supervised .... " 205
In Dillon v. United States, 206 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit did not consider it error for the 2255 judge to act as the
presidingjudge and as a formal witness where he was merely asked
one question which he refused to answer. 207 Petitioner attempted
in that case to demonstrate that a promise had been made to him by
the United States Attorney that he would recommend to the judge
a reduced sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. 208 He then called

/d. at 930.
430 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971).
201 /d. at 400.
202/d. at 401.
2oa1d.
20•1d.
205 /d. at 402.
206 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
201 Since the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of counsel and re111anded
for a hearing, the majority did not consider it necessary to reach petitioner's second claim
that the 2255 judge should not have presided because he had taken the witness stand.
Nonetheless, the court implicitly rejected the claim by remanding to the same judge for
further proceedings, saying only that "[o]ther grounds urged for reversal by the appellant
are unlikely to arise at a second hearing prepared and conducted by an attorney." 307 F .2d
at 451.
208/d. at 446, 448.
199

200
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the judge to the witnes9 stand and asked him whether he had been
given impressions of such a promise by the presentence report. 209
When the Government objected to this question, the judge sustained the objection and then, following his own ruling, refused to
answer_the question. 210 At the conclusion of the hearing, "[t]he
court found that there was no absolute promise that a recommendation would be made, and that appellant knew a recommendation might not be requested." 211
The dissent asserted that "[a]ny error that could be attached to
the trial judge acting both as presiding judge and witness could not
have been prejudicial, particularly here where but one question
was asked of the judge and none answered. " 212 He justified this
procedure on the basis of the presumed historical purpose of section 2255 to permit the same judge to preside. 213
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, in
Davis v. United States, 214 that where the judge's recollections
differ from petitioner's, petitioner has the right to an evidentiary
hearing before that judge to try to convince him that his recollections are faulty. 215 In 1935, petitioner Davis, without assistance of
counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnapping and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 216 Fifteen years later, he filed a motion to vacate the sentence before the same judge alleging, among
other things, that he had been sentenced without advice of counsel
and without knowing that he had a right to counsel. 217
The 2255 judge denied his motion without a hearing, basing the
denial upon the conclusiveness of the files and records, which
showed that petitioner was not entitled to relief, 218 and upon his
own personal recollections, which were "corroborated" by the
record. 219 The memorandum opinion found that petitioner had
been fully apprised of his right to counsel, and that he had intelligently waived that right. 220 The record of the original guilty plea,
however, reflected only that upon being questioned by the court
the defendant had "stated that he did not desire the advice of

209 /d. at 453 n.2 (dissenting opinion); and at 450 (question paraphrased in the majority
opinion).
210/d. at 450-51.
211 /d. at 449.
212 /d. at 453 (dissenting opinion).
21a1d.
214 210 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1954).
215 /d. at 122.
•i•Jd. at 119.
2111d.
218 /d. at 120.
219/d. at 122.
2201d.

74

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:44

counsel and entered a plea of guilty of the charge in the indictment. "221
The court of appeals stated that while the 2255 judge had denied
petitioner the evidentiary hearing contemplated by section 2255, it
would appear to be "a comparatively useless expenditure of time
and money to hold a hearing" in order to give a convicted person
an opportunity to convince the trial judge that his recollection was
faulty. 222 Nonetheless, the court reversed and remanded to the
same judge for the required hearing, saying, "there is no good
reason why [the petitioner] should not have the same opportunity
to correct what he believes to be a faulty recollection of the
judge. "223
Burris, Dillion, and Davis were decided under a procedure analogous to that now imposed by rule 4(a); they demonstrate clearly
the improbability that 2255 proceedings pursuant to the rule 4(a)
procedure will be anything more than a pro forma review.
3. Statutory Disqualification Where the judge is or may be a
"Material Witness" -Prior to its revision in 1974, 28 U .S.C. § 455
provided in part that a federal judge must recuse "in any case in
which he ... is or has been a material witness .... " 224 In United
States v. Smith, 225 petitioner argued that the judge who took his
guilty pleas and sentenced him should not be permitted to rule on
his motion to vacate since the judge had been a "material witness"
to the events that transpired in the criminal proceedings, and
thereafter had relied upon his memory of those events to supplement the record at the 2255 hearing. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, saying that the judge was
not a "material witness" within the meaning of section 455. 226 This
conclusion was based upon the Carvell decision 227 and Judge
Parker's view of the purpose of section 2255. 228 The court
reasoned that the purpose of section 2255 was to permit the trial
judge, because he was familiar with the prior proceedings and was
able to supplement the record, to pass upon 2255 motions, and that
it would be anomalous to disqualify that same judge under section
455 because of his familiarity with the proceedings. 229
221

/d. -at 121 n.2.

222

/d. at 122.

22a1d.
224 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 908. For a discussion of the revision of 28 U .S.C.
455, see Comment, The Elusive Appearance of Propriety: Judicial Disqualification under
Section 455, 25 DE PAUL L. REY. 104 (1975).
225 337 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 916 (1%5).
226 337 F.2d at 53.
227 Carvell v. United States, 173 F.2d 348 (4th Cir. 1949).
228 Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 172-73 (1948), cited as
support for the holding in United States v. Smith, 337. F.2d at 52.
229/d. at 53.
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There is no basis for this result. The legislative intent of section
2255 does not disclose any such purpose; on the contrary, it discloses an intent to place the hearing in a convenient forum to
permit easy access to records and witnesses, including the trial
judge if he is called to testify. 230 Nonetheless, since 28 U.S.C. §
455 has been completely revised to expand the coverage of the
recusation requirement, the question should be reconsidered. Section 455 now provides that "[a]ny ... judge ... shall disqualify
himself in any proceeeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. " 231 One of the purposes of this revision is to
remove the supposed "duty to sit" even though actual bias or
impartiality cannot be demonstrated. 232 The other purpose is to
establish an objective "reasonableness" test, eliminating the subjective test based upon the judge's "own opinion" of the propriety
of his presiding. 233
The revised statute also sets forth explicit categories in which a
judge must recuse and which may not be waived by the parties.
One nonwaivable category is the required recusation of the judge
who is a "material witness." There are two "material witness"
provisions. The first is section 455(b)(2), which states that the
judge "shall ... disqualify himself ... where ... the judge ...
has been a material witness concerning [the matter in controversy]. " 234 The only apparent difference between this provision and
the prior one is that the new section is governed by the no-waiver
clause.
The second provision dealing with "material witness" is section
455(b)(5)(iv), which states that the judge "shall ... disqualify
himself [where] [h]e ... [i]s to the judge's knowledge likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding. " 235 This provision is entirely
new. It goes beyond the old statute by requiring the judge to
anticipate the likelihood of his being a witness. If he considers it
likely, then presumably he must recuse even before he is called as a
witness. This section seems to be addressed both to the impropri-

See notes 30-45 and accompanying text supra.
'28 U .S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. V 1975).
232 See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
Ao. NEWS 6355. The Report states that the general standard under§ 455 (a)
is designed to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process
by saying, in effect', if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's
impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over the
case .... [L]egal writers and witnesses at the hearings were unanimously of the
opinion that elimination of this "duty to sit" would enhance public confidence in
the impartiality of the judicial system.
233 /d. at 6354-55.
234 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
235 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iv) (Supp. V 1975).
230
23
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ety of a judge's presiding over a matter in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, and to the lack of judicial
economy in presiding over a matter where he might ultimately be
required to recuse. Where the judge has knowledge of certain facts,
making it likely that he will ultimately be called as a witness, it
would seem inappropriate for him to preside over the initial portions of the hearing, to control the introduction of evidence, to limit
or expand the right to examine or cross-examine, and to make
initial findings of fact, and then to participate as a material witness,
presumably to refute certain evidence or testimony upon which he
has entered preliminary rulings. There is no reason to presume that
a judge's impartiality may only be questioned where he is first a
material witness and then a factfinder; the potential for bias can. be
as acute where he is first the presiding judge and then the material
witness.
Where the judge participates as an informal witness, pursuant to
Judge Parker's notion of a 2255 proceeding, it would be equally
prejudicial. Because it is clearly the policy of Congress to encourage judicial integrity (three statutes govern the subject of judicial
disqualification), 236 there is no merit in the contention of the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that section 455 does not apply to
2255 proceedings. Section 455 excepts no judicial proceeding, expressly or impliedly, from its requirement that no judge may preside over any hearing where he was, is, or is likely to be a "material witness'' in that same hearing. Moreover, section 2255 does
not, expressly or impliedly, require or permit the presiding judge to
participate as a witness, nor does it exempt the presiding judge
from any statutory recusation requirement. It is submitted that no
exemption should be implied by the courts.

IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

A.

Contempt and Habeas Corpus

The question whether it is a denial of due process to permit the
same judge to rule upon the validity of his own prior sentence and
criminal trial conduct has never been fairly considered by any
federal court. An analogous question has, however, been considered in the law of contempt. In contempt proceedings, the same
judge who charged a person with contempt is generally permitted

236

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144 (1970) and§ 455 (Supp. V 1975).

FALL

1976]

Objectivity and Habeas Corpus

77

to preside over the trial to determine whether that person was
indeed contemptuous. In that situation, the Supreme Court has
ruled in Ungar v. Sarafite 237 that a judge is not presumed to be
biased, requiring his recusation, unless the allegedly contemptuous
behavior was "so probably productive of bias that the judge must
disqualify himself to avoid being the judge in his own case
"238

The initial question, whether it is a denial of due process to
permit the criminal trial judge to preside at the hearing on motion to
vacate, was raised in United States v. Smith. 239 While petitioner's
appeal was pending, however, Ungar v. Sarafite 240 was decided by
the Supreme Court. Petitioner then withdrew his due process
claim, apparently in the belief that Ungar was controlling, and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, also of the opinion that
Ungar was dispositive of petitioner's due process claim, commented in a footnote to its opinion that Ungar "rejected the contention of a defendant in a contempt proceeding that he had been
denied due process of law because the judge who presided at the
contempt hearing was the same judge who had presided at the trial
in which defendant's contemptuous conduct occurred. " 241
This is not an accurate statement of the Ungar decision; but,
even if it were, the law of contempt should not be applied to the law
of habeas corpus for several reasons. 242 First, the two situations
are not analogous. In order for a contempt proceeding to be
analogous to a habeas or 2255 proceeding, there would have to be a
judgment of contempt already entered against the defendant, which
was then attacked in a subsequent proceeding on the basis of some
infirmity or irregularity. Obviously, if the judge who found the
defendant in contempt and sentenced him were then to rule upon
the validity of his own sentence, the review would be considered
inadequate; 243 indeed, no such procedure exists in the law of

376 U.S. 575 (1964).
/d. at 583.
239 337 F.2d 49, 51 n.4 (1964).
240 376 U.S. 575.
241 United States v. Smith, 337 F.2d at 51 n.4.
242 The law of contempt has had a long and checkered history of its own; its problems
should not be imposed upon habeas corpus. For a discussion of the problems and abuses of
contempt, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts -A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1010 (1924); Harper and Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 60 YALE L.J. I,
46-53 (1951); Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 956
(1931); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 28 CoLUM. L. REV. 401, 425 (1928).
243 Review of contempt proceedings is by appeal. 28 U .S.C. § 47 (1970) prohibits a trial
judge from sitting as an appellate judge to review decisions which he entered while sitting as
a trial judge.
237
238
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contempt, nor has any such procedure ever been considered or
approved.
Second, the apparent analogy that judges in both contempt and
habeas proceedings use their past personal observations in order to
decide issues of fact in the subsequent proceeding does not hold in
light of the differing functions served by the two proceedings. A
contempt proceeding is an attempt to impose the court's immediate
authority and power to conduct its business unobstructed by outbursts or intimidation, and to punish for any such interference. 244
It is not a review of a final judgment, and does not purport to insure
the validity of prior court rulings as does habeas corpus. Since it is
the trial judge's immediate authority which is in jeopardy, it is'
presumed that the same judge will enforce his right to control the
conduct of his court, 245 unless he is otherwise disqualified. 246 In
contrast, habeas corpus presents no issue that requires the trial
judge to act immediately. Rather, it is the trial judge's conduct or
rulings that at some later time are called into question, and there is
no reason to presume that the same judge may insure the integrity
of that proceeding better than any other judge.
Third, there are seemingly better checks upon the accuracy of
the personal observations made by a judge presiding over contempt
proceedings. Contempt involves personal observations of the court
upon which it acts immediately by giving instructions and warnings, calling for a recess, or removing persons from the court, and
ultimately charging one with contempt. The behavior charged as
contemptuous is thus made a matter of record in the first proceeding contemporaneously with the observation. The 2255 judge's
personal observations, on the other hand, are not challenged immediately; attention is not drawn to the behavior that may constitute a ground for a later motion to vacate. Thus, the judge's
observations are not made a part of the record in the prior proceeding, and there is therefore no certitude that the judge's observations are accurate when later recalled. Additionally, in contempt
proceedings, even where personal observations of the judge are
reserved and introduced at a later hearing, the judge is aware that
the incident will result in a hearing. He will schedule the hearing
promptly at the close of the main trial, and he will set forth the

244S ee Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 164 (1965); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S.
517, 534 (1925).
245 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463 (1971), where the Court said that the
outbursts which took place entitled the trial judge to use a variety of weapons to keep order
in his courtroom, but that in the instant case, the outbursts so "vilified" the judge that due
process required a hearing before a different judge. Id. at 465, 466.
246 See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133
(1955); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II (1954).
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specific acts considered contemptuous in written specifications, 247
giving notice of the pending hearing to defendant. 248 It is the judge
who takes the initiative in deciding to proceed on contempt, and
who, having made the charge of contempt, is thus likely to keep the
incident fresh in his mind. Habeas corpus, on the other hand, may
be brought at any time, 249 not at the judge's instance, but at the
petitioner's. The motion may concern any number of issues that
the court may or may not have considered at one time or another.
Thus, there is less likelihood that the judge will keep all possible
issues and all past occurrences in all the criminal proceedings
conducted before him fresh in his mind in anticipation of some later
hearing.
Since the contempt and habeas procedures are so distinct, it may
therefore be concluded that the law of contempt should not glibly
be applied to the law of habeas corpus.
B.

Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Causa

The maxim that no man ought to be the judge of his own cause is
fundamental to the notion of due process of law. Where one has a
financial interest in a matter, it becomes his own cause;-250 due
process requires that where a judge has even a de minimis financial
interest in a matter being litigated before him he must recuse. 251
While some have urged that the definition of "cause" or "interest"
should be limited solely to financial matters, 252 it is obvious that
judges have many interests that may affect the objectivity of their
judgments, and the Supreme Court has not so limited the definition. 253 Thus, one's own cause may be emotional as well as financial.254 When ajudge becomes "personally embroiled" in a matter
that initially was not his own, it becomes his cause, requiring
recusation. 255 Moreover, where a judge does not actually make a
cause his own, but it appears to be his, recusation may also be
required. This is generally grounded upon a notion of propriety. 256

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a) & (b).
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b).
249 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the relevant part set out at note 79 supra.
250 See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927).
251 See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. at 60 (even when there was "nQ direct
sharing" in funds, there was a "possible temptation" to be partial).
•••see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 142 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
253 /d. at 136-39.
254 See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 600 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
250 See Offutt v.·United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517
(1925).
256 See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. at 14.
241
248
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Some relationships create such an appearance of impropriety
that due process requires recusation. For example, the Supreme
Court held in the case of In re Murchison 251 that due process
requires recusation even in contempt proceedings (where recusation is not normally required) when there is a conflict of interest in
the roles the judge performs in the adjudicatory process·. 258
The Court in Murchison reviewed a Michigan statute which
provided that any judge of a Michigan court of record may act as a
"one-man grand jury" to take evidence in secret concerning suspected crimes. The Court held that it violated due process for the
judge, who first presided as the grand jury and charged defendant
with contempt, to preside over the required public trial on the
contempt charge. 259
The Murchison opinion reflects a multifaceted rationale involving the notion of interest, 260 the appearance of propriety, 261 and the
right to examine and cross-examine witnesses. 262 The Court, relying heavily upon the notion of "interest" and upon the case of
Tumey v. Ohio, 263 commented that "[i]t would be very strange if
our system of law permitted a judge to act as a grand jury and then
try the very persons accused as a result of his investigations. " 264
By the very nature of the procedure, the judge would not be
considered a "wholly disinterested" party. 265 Of particular importance to the Court was the high probability that the trial judge's
recollections of the grand jury proceeding would "weigh far more
heavily with him" than the testimony in the subsequent open
hearing. 266 The Court reasoned that it would be difficult for a judge
to free himself from the influence of the grand jury proceedings, 267
and said:

349 U.S. 133 (1955).
1d. at 138-39.
2591d. at 139.
260 1d. at 136, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
261 ld., citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II, 14 (1954).
2621d. at 138-39.
263273 U.S. 510 (1927).
2641n re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
2••1d.
2661d. at 138.
2671d. The Court then quoted from the trial judge's findings as an example of the judge's
lack of objectivity:
[T]here is one thing the record does not show, and that was [defendant's] attitude,
and I must say that his attitude was almost insolent in the manner in which he
answered questions and his attitude upon the witness stand .... Not only was the
personal attitude insolent, but it was defiant, and I want to put that on the record.
Id. In response to defense counsel's request that this comment be stricken from the record
since it was not contained in the original record, the judge continued, "That is something
... _that wouldn't appear on the record, bu_t it would be very evident to the court." Id.
251

258
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Thus the judge whom due process requires to be impartial in
weighing the evidence presented before him, called on his own
personal knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the
grand jury room and his judgment was based in part on this
impression, the accuracy of which could not be tested by
adequate cross-examination. 268

Of course, one of the factors in the Court's determination that
the procedure was inappropriate under due process standards was
the secrecy of the first proceeding; 269 there were thus no public
witnesses to give "disinterested" testimony. 270 But also important, and given the greater consideration, was the fact that the
judge was a "very material witness" 271 in the contempt proceeding. Thus, the Court concluded:
[T]he result would be either that the defendant must be deprived of examining or cross-examining [the judge] or else there
would be the spectacle of the trial judge presenting testimony
upon which he must finally pass in determining the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. In either event the State would
have the benefit of the judge's personal knowledge while the
accused would be denied an effective oppportunity to crossexamine. The right of a defendant to examine and crossexamine witnesses is too essential to a fair trial to have that
right jeopardized in such way. 272

Not unlike the judicial procedure condemned by the Supreme
Court in Murchison, rule 4(a) creates conflicting roles to be performed by the 2255 judge by placing him in the position of being
both a witness to past events and a judge deciding the truth concerning those past events. Rule 4(a) therefore does not provide a
procedure that imparts an appearance of propriety; it provides no
checks upon the accuracy of the court's past recollections; it
provides no opportunity for the petitioner to examine or crossexamine the witnesses against him; it permits the court to be a
"material witness" in a proceeding upon which it must pass judgment; and it places the court in a position of weighing more heavily
its past recollections than the testimony in the proceeding before it.
Thus, rule 4(a) does not satisfy the due process standards established for judges by the Supreme Court in Tumey and Murchison.

2a•1d.
2a•1d.
270 /d. The court stated, "If there had been [public witnesses], thc;y might have been able to
refute the judge's statement .... "
2111d.
212 /d. at 139.
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V. SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT BY VARIANCE
OF ITS PROCEDURE

A. The Real Party in Interest
It has long been said that habeas corpus is an independent civil
remedy brought by a detained. person to assert his right to personal
liberty, to inquire not into the criminal act for which he is detained,
but into his right to liberty notwithstanding that act. 273 Upon an
allegation of unlawful detention, a court having jurisdiction to issue
the writ would order the jailor to deliver the body of petitioner
before the court and show cause why the prisoner was being
detained. 274 It is significant that the writ issued from a superior
court to inquire into the exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior
court, 275 so the habeas corpus review was traditionally conducted
by a judge who had no prior knowledge or connection with the
court whose judgment was under attack. Moreover, from the time
of its development as a means of challenging the validity of detention until very recently, habeas corpus was used to challenge
detention prior to trial, rather than after trial.2 76 Thus, demonstration to the habeas court that petitioner was detained by the final
judgment of another court was sufficient cause to dismiss the
petition, unless it could also be shown that the inferior court had
entered the judgment without jurisdiction to do so. 277 The real
party in interest in pretrial habeas proceedings was the jailor whose
right to custody was at issue; the real party in interest where final
judgment was pleaded as cause for detention was the inferior court
whose power to enter the judgment was being challenged.
In contrast, the American habeas remedy has evolved into an
essentially post-trial remedy, 278 calling into question more than the
simple custody of the jailor or the power of an inferior court to try
the petitioner. The issues subject to challenge include the criminal

273 See Riddle v: Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 494
(1885); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883).
274 See Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The. Emergence of the Modern Writ-I, 18
CAN. B. REV. 10, 12-13 (1940).
275 See Id. at 14 which states "[T]he corpus cum causa was itself employed to defeat
causes in inferior courts." See also Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas
Corpus, 16 CAN. 8. REV. 92, 112 (1938); R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS,§ 8, at 4-5, 7
(2d ed. 1%9).
276See Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 244-45
(1965).
.
271 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830).
278See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 59, 59 n. 13 (1968). See also, Oaks, supra not~ 276, at
245.
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court's conduct and rulings prior to, during, and after trial that
have arguably deprived petitioner of some constitutional right. 279
The habeas remedy thus places the acts of the criminal trial judge
at the very center of the inquiry, making him the real party in
interest. And even though the jailor (the Government) is named on
a motion to vacate sentence, it is but a nominal party, because its
detention of petitioner is by order of the criminal trial judge. To say
that this same judge will issue an order to show cause why
petitioner is being detained seems absurd. If anyone knows, it must
certainly be the judge who ordered petitioner detained.
Despite the long tradition that a different judge eonduct the
habeas review, it has more recently been suggested that the trial
judge ought to be.given the first opportunity to pass upon a motion
attacking the validity of his sentence, just as he is given first
opportunity to pass upon a motion to recuse for bias or prejudice. 280 On motion to recuse for bias or prejudice, however, the
trial judge must accept the facts alleged in the affidavit of bias as
true, 281 and then simply rule on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. 282 In contrast, review on habeas corpus (or on a motion to
vacate) involves the exercise of a vast array of discretionary powers, frequently involves factfinding, and may require the criminal
trial judge to participate as a witness to the matter being challenged. Factfinding and the exercise of discretionary powers are
subject to limited appellate review, 283 whereas the legal sufficiency
of an affidavit of bias is fully subject to appellate review.
One might also consider collateral review to be analogous to the
trial judge's first opportunity to rule upon trial errors by some
post-trial motion, such as a motion for a new trial, a motion in
arrest of judgment, or a motion to correct or reduce sentence. This
analogy would be sound if habeas corpu~ (or a motion to vacate)
functioned simply to permit the trial judge to correct his own trial
errors. But if this is the purpose of habeas corpus, then it is
redundant, adding nothing to the procedures already available for
review by post-trial motions except to avoid the time limitations
imposed upon them.

See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2241 & 2255 (1970).
See Note, Processing A Motion Attacking Sentence Under Section 2255 Of The
Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 788, 801 (1963).
281 See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d
761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d
794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1962); Mitchell v.
United States, 126 F.2d 550, 552 (10th Cir. 1942).
••·•see Tynan v. United States, 376 F."2d 761, 764(D.C. Cir. 196'7),cert. denied, 389 U.S.
845 (1967); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1942); Simmons v. United States,
'302 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550,552 (10th Cir. 1942).
283See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra.
279

280

84

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:44

In Townsend v. Sain, 284 the Supreme Court asserted that habeas
corpus "is to test by way of an original civil proceeding, independent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments,'' the
validity of the incarceration. 285 In Kaufman v. United States, 286
the Court reiterated the function of habeas corpus as stated in
Townsend adding that "the availability of collateral remedies is
necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial
where constitutional rights are at stake. " 287 What does it mean to
say that habeas corpus is different from direct appeal in a criminal
proceeding? Or that it is an independent review? Or that it exists to
insure the integrity of the criminal proceeding? Surely the criminal
trial judge, having heard testimony and being, perhaps, convinced
of petitioner's guilt, will find it difficult to view the 2255 petition
without taking the fact of guilt into consideration. The court may
consider itself a protector of the criminal judgment, thereby destroying the objective and independent qualities anticipated in
habeas corpus review. Thus, where the criminal trial judge, by his
rulings, becomes the real party in interest, he should not preside
over the collateral review challenging the validity of those rulings.
B.

Procedural Character of the Writ

Artice I, § 9 of the United States Constitution, by providing that
"[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended .... , " asserts that there is some protected privilege that
cannot be taken away. Presumably, the privilege of the writ was so
well known to the framers of the Constitution that they saw no
need to define it; it was later deemed sufficient to "resort ... to
the common law" to determine the meaning and extent of habeas
corpus. 288
Examination of common law notions of the writ of habeas corpus
cum causa reveal that by the fourteenth century the writ issued to
order the body of the one detained to be brought before the
court, 289 and to require the custodian to declare by what authority
he detained the prisoner. 290 This review by habeas corpus included
the power to release the prisoner whenever the jailor's justification
was legally insufficient. 291 The definition of legal sufficiency has,

U.S. 293 (1963).
at 311-12.
286 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
287/d. at 225.
288Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
289 See Cohen, supra note 274.
290/d. at 13.
291 /d. at 19-20.
284 372
285/d.
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of course, fluctuated over the centuries, but the unique and simple
procedure by which one court reviewed the validity of another
court's power (or the jailor's power) to imprison a person has made
the writ of habeas corpus a time-honored symbol of freedom. It has
been lauded and esteemed as the "great writ, " 292 as the "best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom," 293 and as the "principal bulwark of English liberty. " 294 It may be presumed that it
would not have been worthy of inclusion in the United States
Constitution were it not valued both as a symbol and as an effective
remedy for the protection of individual liberty.
Preservation of the privilege of the writ requires more than
protecting the right to raise the same substantive issues by motion
to vacate as were available by habeas corpus. The substantive
issues cognizable by habeas corpus merely determine the occasions upon which habeas corpus may be invoked. Habeas corpus is
essentially "a procedural device" ; 295 it is thus irrelevant that the
meaning of' 'validity'' of incarceration has changed since the fourteenth century. The underlying function of the habeas remedy has
remained the same: to challenge the exercise of power denying a
person his liberty. 296 Preservation of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus necessarily requires the protection of this basic
procedural character.
Section 2255, like habeas corpus, is supposed to provide a review of the criminal trial judge's rulings on jurisdictionai and constitutional issues and the adequacy of his factfinding upon which
those rulings are based. Section 2255 is considered the equivc1lent
of habeas corpus, and is the substituted remedy for federal prisoners to the privilege of habeas corpus preserved by the Constitution. 297
.
In Judge Stone's statement of purpose to Congress, he asserted
that section 2255 was "in the nature of, but much broader than,
co ram no bis .... As a remedy, it is intended to be as broad as
See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
/d. at 95. See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (concurring opinion).
294 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 512 (concurring opinion).
295 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968). See D. MEADOR, HABEAS CoRPUS AND
MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 19 (1966).
296See Cohen, supra note 274, at 12-13:
It will be remembered that the earliest writs of habeas corpus ... had only a
single purpose in view, to have a desired party before the court. As yet there was
nothing to suggest that the cause of the arrest or detention be given to the courts
292

293

Habeas corpus cum causa ... may have made its appearance in the first years of
the 14th century .... The significance of this wording is two-fold; it presumes that
there is detention, and it asserts the court's right to inquire into the case ....
See also R. SOKOL, supra note 275; Cohen, supra note 275; Jenks, supra note 24.
291 See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,217,219 (1952). Accord, Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962).
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habeas corpus. " 298 A reasonable construction of this statement is
that the remedy of habeas corpus should be provided in a more
convenient forum, that is, where the records, files, and witnesses
are located, or in the jurisdiction where the criminal judgment was
rendered; the Supreme Court has so construed the statute in
United States v. Hayman. 299 The Court thought that no constitutional question of suspension of the writ was raised by section 2255
because the Court deemed the statutory provision to be a complete
and effective substitute for habeas corpus, providing "the same
rights in another and more convenient forum. " 300
Section 2255 has nevertheless been considered a "hybrid" remedy, 301 incorporating not only the notions of the writ of habeas
corpus, but also the notions of the writ of error coram nobis. 302
Coram nobis and remedies in the nature of the ancient writ of error
coram nobis provide a form of self-review to permit the court that
entered judgment to correct its own errors. 303 Historically, the
review seems to have been limited and technical, correcting matters not known to the judge at the time of entry of the judgment,
and correcting clerical errors of the record. 304 No question of the
judge's fairness was at issue, nor was the judge considered to have
been in error by rendering his first judgment. With respect to such
technical matters, self-review seems adequate.
Habeas corpus, however, was never a form of self-review as was
coram nobis; review was by some independent authority. Had
habeas corpus procedure ever required the petitioner to go to the
jailor to plead the jailor's error in incarcerating him, or to go to the
criminal trial judge to plead that the judge's exercise of power was
beyond his jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus would certainly
have fallen into oblivion. It is the requirement of accountability by
the jailor or by the court for taking away a person's liberty that has
342 U.S. at 216-17.
342 u .s. 205 (1952).
300Jd. at 219 (emphasis added).
301 S ee Martin v. United States, 273 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
853 (1961).
302/d. at 776- 78.
303 See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), where the Supreme Court discussed
the nature of the writ of error coram nobis, quoting a commentator as follows:
If a judgment in the King's Bench be erroneous in matter of fact only, and not in
point of law, it may be reversed and in the same court, by writ of error co ram nob is
.... [F]or error in fact is not error of the judges, and. reversing it is not reversing
their own judgment. So, upon a judgment in the King's Bench, if there be error in
the process, or through the default of the clerks, it may be reversed in the same
court, by writ of error coram nobis ....
See also, Bums v. United States, 321 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
959 (1963); Lipscomb v. United States, 273 F.2d 860, 865 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 836 (1960).
304 See Lamb v. State, 91 Fla. 396,401, 107 So. 535,537 (1926); Rhodes v. State, 199 Ind.
183, 192, 156 N.E. 389, 392 (1927).
298
299
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made the writ great. Self-review is simply not enough to protect
that constitutional privilege.
The independence of the habeas proceeding from the prior criminal proceedings 305 and the irrelevance of the question of guilt to
the issues raised by the writ 306 have long been considered essential
to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To the extent that the
presiding judge permits the criminal proceeding to control his impressions of the habeas petition or his analysis of the issues raised,
the petitioner's right to the independent civil proceeding contemplated by the writ of habeas corpus is jeopardized.
Rule 4(a) is obviously more than procedural; it provides a drastic
substantive change in the concept of habeas corpus. The rule
substitutes the notion of coram nobis review (a form of self-review)
for habeas corpus review, traditionally a review of one court by
another. In so doing, the rule effectively destroys the traditional
notions attached to habeas review.
Ultimately, there must be some point at which the variance in
procedure causes section 2255 no longer to reflect the habeas
remedy. To the extent that section 2255 is an incomplete substitute
for habeas corpus, its exclusive use thereby effectively suspends
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for federal prisoners.

CONCLUSION

Beneath all the efforts of the federal judiciary to revise the
habeas procedures and to regulate the great volume of postconviction petitions brought by state and federal prisoners lies a
sense of frustration. As Mr. Justice Jackson wrote in Brown v.
Allen: 307 "It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application
to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a
haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the
needle is not worth the search.''
The adoption of rule 4(a) reflects an attitude that petitions are
bound to be false, frivolous, and abusive of the collateral process,
and that review must therefore be limited and tightly controlled by
the criminal trial judge to inhibit abuses and avoid the "unseemli-

305See.Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,224 (1969); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 311-12 (1963); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1923).
306 See Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883). 8111 see Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct.
3037, 3050 (1976).
3 o7 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J ., concurring).
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ness" of that judge's work product being reviewed by another
judge. Rule 4(a) imposes upon federal districtjudges the responsibility of holding evidentiary hearings to develop sufficient facts to
permit them to determine the correctness of their own prior rulings. Where the judge interjects his own recollections into the
hearing, he inevitably provides facts upon which he may then rule.
Rule 4(a) thus permits the judge to create his own record to demonstrate the validity, integrity, and fairness of his own prior rulings.
It has been argued that section 455 is applicable to 2255 proceedings, and requires the judge to recuse where he is to be a formal
witness. 308 Necessarily, it is as crucial to the appearance of justice
that the judge not be permitted to act as an informal witness,
avoiding the recusation requirement simply by not formally taking
the witness stand. Permitting the court to proceed in this manner
effectively destroys the objective and impartial review anticipated
by both due process of law, and the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Review by motion to vacate must be effective and fair in
appearance as well as in fact. A meritorious petition is clearly ·
worth the search. The search should therefore be adequate to
discover it:

· 308

See notes 224-36 and accompanying text supra.

